An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH
eprint.iacr.org will be offline for approximately an hour for routine maintenance at 11pm UTC on Tuesday, April 16. We lost some data between April 12 and April 14, and some authors have been notified that they need to resubmit their papers. Abstract We present an efficient key recovery attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman protocol (SIDH). The attack is based on Kani's "reducibility
Freestart collision for full SHA-1
Paper 2015/967 Freestart collision for full SHA-1 Marc Stevens, Pierre Karpman, and Thomas Peyrin Abstract This article presents an explicit freestart colliding pair for SHA-1, i.e. a collision for its internal compression function. This is the first practical break of the full SHA-1, reaching all 80 out of 80 steps. Only 10 days of computation on a 64-GPU cluster were necessary to perform this at
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